Family firm local involvement and the Local Home Bias phenomenon by Baschieri, Giulia et al.
Long Range Planning 50 (2017) 93e107Contents lists available at ScienceDirectLong Range Planning
journal homepage: http: / /www.elsevier .com/locate/ l rpFamily ﬁrm local involvement and the Local Home Bias
phenomenon
Giulia Baschieri, Andrea Carosi, Stefano MengoliResearch has documented that most of retail and institutional investors exhibit a strong preference for stocks issued by nearby listed ﬁrms
(i.e. Local Home Bias). This phenomenon shapes corporate market value and the cost of funding. In this paper, we investigate whether the
Local Home Bias is enhanced in family ﬁrms as a consequence of their symbiotic connection with the local community. Using a dataset of
2,951 Italian ﬁrm-year observations (1,481 are family ﬁrms) over the period 1999e2011, we ﬁnd that Local Home Bias is not a widespread
phenomenon and mainly occurs in founding family ﬁrms where the founder serves as CEO. The Local Home Bias is absent in non-family
ﬁrms or in family ﬁrms where the owner has acquired control through a market transaction. Overall, results suggest that locally
committed family ﬁrms trigger investor preference for local stocks and, in doing so, exploit the dedicated local clientele which shrinks the
cost of funding. Ultimately, we argue the social contributions of family ﬁrms to the local community could even have opportunistic traits
and a non-trivial economic effect.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Research highlights that most investors have the tendency to tilt their portfolios towards stocks issued by nearby listed
ﬁrms (the so-called Local Home Bias, henceforth also LHB). One out of ten companies in a US fund manager’s portfolio is
chosen because it is located in the same city as the manager (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) and about twenty percent over
optimal is invested, by US retail investors, in ﬁrms headquarteredwithin 250miles (Ivkovic andWeisbenner, 2005). Literature
recognizes the LHB deﬁnes segmented markets at the regional level and affects corporate market values and a ﬁrm’s cost of
capital (e.g., Hong et al., 2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013). In fact, the LHB implies a portion of local investor wealth will be
invested in local equity and the equity-markets are segmented based on investor proximity with the issuing ﬁrms: conse-
quently, ﬁrms isolated from other listed ﬁrms beneﬁt from a larger dedicated clientele of local investors, pushing the market
prices up on the available local stocks (e.g., Baschieri et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2008). As a consequence, isolated ﬁrms trade at a
premium compared to clustered ﬁrms. Understanding the root of the LHB, which seems to be partly based on the feeling of
familiarity investors have toward local ﬁrms (e.g., Huberman, 2001), will therefore have important implications for ﬁrm
management strategies and entrepreneurial decisions. To date, very few studies have dealt with this issue or provided sig-
niﬁcant empirical evidence.
We explore a gap in the knowledge and investigate whether the feeling of familiarity among local investors is triggered by
the distinctive bond family ﬁrms have with their local community, ultimately boosting the preference for stocks issued by
nearby (family) ﬁrms. There is voluminous research pointing to rational decisional models for stock investment decisions (e.g.
Coval andMoskowitz, 2001); yet, recent studies also point to behavioural models which suggest that familiarity is a key factor
in explaining these decisions (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). For instance, previous evidence suggests investors exhibit a
bias towards ﬁrms that produce easily recognizable products (Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005), and towards geographically
proximate ﬁrms whose chief executives speak the same language as the investor or shares the same cultural background
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). To explain such behaviour, Cao et al. (2011) propose a model where individuals psycho-
logically tend to use a focal choice as benchmark (the status quo) to compare to other possible alternatives. The status quo
benchmark is ‘familiar, cognitively simple to analyse, salient, and assigned by default’ (Cao et al., 2011, 174), which cannot
easily be replaced by an alternative due to a psychological fear of change and a fear of the unfamiliar.
We apply this framework to the LHB, and conjecture that local investors have stronger feelings of familiarity toward family
ﬁrms than toward non-family ﬁrms, due to the way family ﬁrms establish tighter bonds with local communities and theirhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2016.10.001
0024-6301/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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to hold local family ﬁrm stocks which become the focal choice or status quo in portfolio decisions. To test this hypothesis we
compare the LHB in different kinds of ﬁrms, based on the type of owner. Firms are divided into four categories: non-family
ﬁrms, family ﬁrms, founding family ﬁrms, and founding family ﬁrms where the founder serves as CEO.We expect the effect of
the LHB to increase as we move in the analysis from non-family to founder CEO founding family ﬁrms, as a consequence of
their different capacities to build ties with (and within) the local community (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
We posit that the entrepreneur, through her/his actions, can boost and exploit local investor preference for her/his ﬁrm’s
stocks and, in doing so, affects the cost of funding. In fact, we assume the interaction between entrepreneurs and commu-
nities is dynamic and as such, the entrepreneur can use her/his networks even to create the business environment (see among
others, Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). The networking process should be particularly well enhanced in family ﬁrms with
respect to non-family ﬁrms, due to their stronger ties to the local communities (e.g., Astrachan, 1988; Kahn and Henderson,
1992), especially when the founder serves as CEO (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, no investigation of
this kind has been conducted.
Bridging the research on LHB and family ﬁrms, the intent of our paper is at least twofold. On one hand, we test whether the
stronger feeling of familiarity toward the local family ﬁrms drives the investor preference for local stocks and on the other, we
test from a new perspective whether (even large listed) family ﬁrms and communities interact, in a way that ultimately
shrinks their cost of funding. We expect the LHB and related implications on ﬁrm value and entrepreneurial decision making
to strengthen in isolated family ﬁrms. In addition, we suggest the mixed evidence supporting family ﬁrms as best performers
in ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003) is not merely due to the way in which family businesses are deﬁned
(Miller et al., 2007) but even to the different emotional and/or economic attachments family ﬁrms have to the hosting
community, compared to non-family ﬁrms. Adding a novel and relevant dimension to family ﬁrm research, we believe our
study deepens the current understanding on the conﬂicting ﬁndings of family ﬁrm performance, and ﬁlls a gap in the
literature introducing the effect of the local economic development on family ﬁrm management strategies and entrepre-
neurial decisions. The literature already recognizes that e compared to non-family ﬁrms e family ﬁrms are more prone to
active engagement with their stakeholders and preserve their socio-emotional wealth (Cennamo et al., 2012), though we are
the ﬁrst to investigate whether a ﬁrm’s socio-emotional goal has an economically rational, yet concealed, origin. We suggest
the link developed with local communities by a family ﬁrm could be instrumental to its economic interests, improving the
ﬁnancial performance via a LHB effect. For the family ﬁrm more embedded with its local stakeholders, the consequence
would therefore be the reconciliation of the socio-emotional wealth with the economic wealth, two aspects so far kept
unrelated by the literature on the topic (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010).
We ﬁrst present a detailed analysis of the 7,487 shareholders owning at least one share in a typical Italian founding family
ﬁrm. Conclusive evidence on the existence and the drivers of LHBwithin the family ﬁrm setting, and support for the empirical
investigation of the LHB in the family ﬁrm context follows. Then, a thirteen year (1999e2011) dataset on 2,951 Italian listed
ﬁrms (1,481 of which are family ﬁrms) is used to estimate the LHB across different types of family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms.
The investor preference for local stocks results in isolated ﬁrms trading at a premium compared to clustered ﬁrms located in
regions with the presence of several listed ﬁrms. Consistently, we ﬁnd that the isolated founder-managed family ﬁrm has a
market value that is on average about 33 percent higher than the similar but clustered founder-managed family ﬁrm.
Remarkably, we do not ﬁnd any difference in values when isolated vs. clustered non-family ﬁrms are taken: this (lack of)
evidence is novel compared to prior ﬁndings which do not account for the speciﬁc local dynamics related to family (and non-
family) ﬁrms. Overall, our ﬁndings show that the preference for local stocks is enhanced by the family ﬁrm status, and suggest
only locally committed family ﬁrms dynamically interact with the hosting community to exploit the local dedicated clientele
and shrink their cost of capital.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical development and testable hypothesis. Data
collection and research methodology is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the ﬁndings, while conclusions and impli-
cations for practitioners and researchers are discussed in Section 5.
Family ﬁrms and LHB: research focus and theoretical development
LHB: types of local investors and drivers of their preference for local stocks
The ﬁnancial literature recognizes different roots of LHB. On the one hand, LHB stems from information advantages on the
local ﬁrms: proximity gives investors greater value-relevant information about the local companies, leading to a preference
for local ﬁrms over the non-local ﬁrms (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005). On the other hand,
behavioural factors also come into play as familiarity is a key element in explaining the preference for local equity: it is
associated with a sense of comfort toward what is well known and discomfort with the alien, and adds a non-pecuniary
dimension to investment choices (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).
The main drivers underlying the LHB differ according to the type of investor. The preference for local ﬁrms affects
institutional investors such as mutual funds (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001), hedge funds managers (e.g., Teo, 2009), in-
vestment advisors (e.g., Baik et al., 2010), block acquirers (e.g., Kang and Kim, 2008), and professional traders (e.g., Hau, 2001):
in all the cases, the information advantage of the local institutional investors over the local ﬁrms is the driver of LHB and the
local equity-holdings lead to substantial and positive abnormal returns. However, a growing number of studies highlight that
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household over-invests in local equity and realizes an additional return of 3.2% per year from its local holdings, which
suggests the LHB also stems from an information advantage for the retail investors. Bodnaruk (2009) andMassa and Simonov
(2006) provide further supporting evidence. Yet, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Huberman (2001) show individuals are
more comfortable investing their money in local businesses that are visible and familiar to them. Seasholes and Zhu (2010)
ﬁnd no evidence that individuals earn superior positive returns from their local holdings, which is strongly consistent with a
behavioural explanation of LHB. The information and behavioural perspectives of the LHB are bridged in Karlsson and Norde
́
n
(2007), and Kumar (2009). Karlsson and Norde
́
n (2007) show the LHB is correlated with poorly educated males, especially
employees in public administration with no experience in risky investments; Kumar (2009) concludes that in periods of
market uncertainty, when stocks are harder to value, retail investors have stronger biases and the informed (institutional)
investors exhibit a higher intensity of trades due to their attempt and ability to exploit other investors’ biases.
In light of the stronger ties and the emotional attachments that family ﬁrms have with the community where they are
headquartered (e.g., Gomez-Mejía et al., 2007), we posit that local investors perceive the local family ﬁrms as more familiar
than the non-family ﬁrms. As a consequence, we predict the LHB is mainly related to family ﬁrm stocks. In line with the
literature, the behavioural link with the LHB should be the higher the more retail investors invest in the family ﬁrms; on the
contrary, the presence of local institutional investors in the ﬁrm shareholder base could imply the LHB is also driven by an
information advantage that institutional investors e more than retail investors e are able to locally collect and exploit. The
detailed analysis of a family ﬁrm shareholder base is reported in Section 4.1. Ultimately, the peculiar attachment family ﬁrms
have with their local community and the multiform categorization of family businesses require testable hypotheses to be
developed in the following, dedicated, section.
Family ﬁrms and the LHB: testable hypotheses
Investors are biased towards advertised, visible, and brand name stocks (Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005), issued by
ﬁrms they frequent as customers (Huberman, 2001; Keloharju et al., 2012), and within their two-digit industry of employ-
ment (Døskeland and Hvide, 2011). In brief, investors buy what they feel is familiar. Such feelings of familiarity even drive the
investor preference for geographic proximate equity (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) which, in turn, shapes equity prices
(e.g., Hong et al., 2008). Cao et al. (2011) explain this behaviour showing individuals evaluate sceptically the choice alter-
natives that deviate from the status quo benchmark used for their decisions. The status quo is the default and easily processed
choice for which investors feel comfortable, competent and familiar. It reﬂects fear of change and e basic asset-allocation
principles notwithstanding e in portfolio decisions this is carried out through an individual’s preference for local stocks,
which are perceived as most familiar (e.g., Ackert et al., 2005).
As family ﬁrms are more embedded in their local community than non-family ﬁrms (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010), we posit
family ﬁrms are perceived as more familiar by local investors, and therefore predict the LHB is mainly related to the stocks
they issue. In fact, more than other types of ﬁrms, these companies do not focus exclusively on proﬁt maximization. For
example, when establishing their headquarters, family ﬁrms are sensitive to the proximity of the owner’s residence, due to
the availability of local recreational and cultural activities and the presence of long-term established networks, etc. (Kahn
and Henderson, 1992). In addition, family ﬁrms tend to share their prosperity with neighbouring communities (e.g.,
Graaﬂand, 2002), and rely on surrounding areas as a resource for business operations, including their workforce, clients and
suppliers (e.g., Lansberg, 1999). Furthermore, the type of commitment toward economic and non-economic goals is affected
by family ﬁrm location: family businesses headquartered in rural areas are more focused on social goals such as the pro-
tection of the local culture, and less committed to enhancing ﬁrm proﬁts (Birley et al. 1999). For example, family ﬁrms are
more likely to sponsor associations and activities that are valued in the community, such as charities, special events, and
local sports teams (Uhlaner, 2006), and address social problems which often exceed the scope of their organizations, such as
issues related to poverty or environmental degradation (Westley and Vredenburg, 1991). This type of engagement serves as
a way to maintain the long-term relationship between the family and its local stakeholders, who reap social and inter-
personal, not merely ﬁnancial, rewards (Gersick, 2004). The emerging socio-emotional wealth (Gomez-Mejía et al., 2007),
that is the stock of affect-related value the family attaches to the business, enhances recognition for generous actions
(Schulze et al., 2003) and accumulation of social capital (Arregle et al., 2007). As an example, Berrone et al. (2010) show that
family-controlled public ﬁrms protect their socio-emotional wealth with better environmental performance than their non-
family counterparts, particularly at the local level where institutional pressures involving environmental actions have a
greater impact. To date, there is no evidence that compliance with these pressures advances the ﬁrm’s economic interests,
although it certainly provides a socio-emotional reward to the family. This type of wealth is naturally accumulated at the
local level since local communities deﬁne corporate social practices and exercise institutional pressure through environ-
mental groups or citizen lawsuits (e.g., Raines, 2002). Ultimately the ﬁrm stands to gain recognition in the community when
it complies with the requests, and is sanctioned if it does not (Baker, 1990). Both positive and negative family ﬁrm be-
haviours are easily divulged by the main channels of information transfer between family ﬁrms and local stakeholders, the
local press, radio and television news (Henriques and Sadorsky,1996). Ultimately, local news (indirectly) pushes family ﬁrms
to behave properly to avoid damaging their reputation, meet the family’s affective needs and to project a positive public
image in the eyes of local investors (e.g. Dyer and Whetten, 2006). In light of the evidence highlighted in the literature, we
posit that local investors perceive family ﬁrms as more familiar than non-family ﬁrms. Therefore, we expect that, when
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So, our ﬁrst testable prediction becomes:
H1: family ﬁrms show higher LHB than non-family ﬁrms
Using the same logic, we posit that family ﬁrms where the founding family remains involved in the ownership and
management of the business (founding family ﬁrms), are indeed more locally embedded than non-founding family ﬁrms,
and will be perceived as more familiar by local investors. We therefore predict the LHB is mainly related to the stocks they
issue. Ample research emphasizes that family ﬁrms are not a homogenous category as the activities aimed at strength-
ening their local embeddedness will vary based on the weight a family principal places on the different dimensions of
socio-emotional wealth preservation (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 2012). For instance, some family ﬁrms have
a strong control-dimension and are more likely to devote time, energy, and money to gain support from those stake-
holders e such as employees and suppliers e that enlarge the family discretion over the ﬁrm’s operations, and to put less
emphasis on the relationships with external stakeholders such as the local community or local media (Cennamo et al.,
2012). We posit non-founding family ﬁrms e that did not create or inherit the business e belong to this group, where
the economic interest and the control over the operational activities plays a leading role in strategy, at the expense of the
other dimensions such as preserving family legacy. On the other hand, other family ﬁrms focus more on the preservation
of the family dynasty. In these cases, the ﬁrm is often founded by the family, and becomes an asset that cannot be easily
sold (Cennamo et al., 2012) as it symbolizes the family heritage and tradition (e.g., Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). The socio-
emotional wealth preservation implies a long-term investment strategy aimed at perpetuating the business so it can
be passed on to descendants (Berrone et al., 2010), and the development of trust-based relationships with local partners
and suppliers (Oba and Semerci€oz, 2005). Accordingly, we postulate founding family ﬁrms to belong to this second group
of ﬁrms. The case of Ford Motor Company provides anecdotal evidence of a highly embedded founding family ﬁrm.
Although it is one of the world largest, most successful, and most proﬁtable family-controlled ﬁrms, Henry Ford main-
tained the ﬁrm headquarters in his small home town on his small farm along the banks of the Rouge River in Dearborn
(Michigan) to stay closer to his people. As shown in Block (2010), family business founders and descendants have
additional personal ties to the local environment. For instance, founding family ﬁrm owners avoid drastically cutting jobs,
and show greater identiﬁcation with the company than non-founding family ﬁrm owners since the culture and personal
history of the founder inevitably shapes the mission, values, and business practices (Hollander and Elman, 1988). The
greater sense of identiﬁcation translates into greater involvement in the business and the founders are even recognized as
stewards of the company (Harris and Ogbonna, 1999). Stewardship accrues in many ways, such as having the founding
family name on the business or the likelihood that they perceive their personal satisfaction and public reputation as being
tied to the ﬁrm and the territory where they live and work. Therefore, while ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors make family ﬁrms more
locally embedded than non-family ﬁrms, management-speciﬁc attributes make founding family ﬁrms more locally
embedded than non-founding family ﬁrms. Ultimately, we posit that local investors perceive the former as more familiar
than the latter and therefore, we predict the LHB to be stronger in founding family ﬁrms rather than non-founding family
ﬁrms, which leads to our second testable prediction:
H2: founding family ﬁrms show higher LHB than non-founding family ﬁrms
In addition to the dynamics at ﬁrm-level and management-level, a third factor strengthens the link between family ﬁrms
and the surrounding environment: the founder serving as CEO. Consistent with our theoretical framework, we posit founder-
CEO family ﬁrms to be more familiar to local investors, and we expect their stocks to be locally preferred to other local family
and non-family ﬁrm stocks. The founder-CEO local bond is brilliantly epitomized by Berghoff (2001) who reports the case of
the world famous harmonica producer e Hohner AG e a German listed family ﬁrm headquartered in Trossigen (Southern
Germany). Matthias Hohner, the founder, soon became the most important citizen in town. Without any prior formal edu-
cation, he even became an adjunct professor at the neighbouring University of Tübingen. According to Berghoff (2001), the
strong connection with the local community (e.g., the whole city council was on his pay-roll) was his power. In fact, the
founder-CEO has a distinctive inﬂuence on family business culture and actions (Athanassiou et al., 2002), invests more in R&D
(Fahlenbrach, 2009) and avoids takeovers (Caprio et al., 2011). In particular, the founder strengthens and creates a more
cohesive topmanagement groupwhich ultimately facilitates the strategic planning process and the creation of a shared vision
and business culture (Athanassiou et al., 2002). In addition, the founder's vision of the ﬁrm is often closely linked to the
culture of the local community, and implies continuous involvement in local community affairs to promote the visibility of the
family in a positive light (Astrachan, 1988). Literature shows family executives are more likely to prevent losses of socio-
emotional wealth (Naldi et al., 2013): locally promoting social initiatives, volunteer efforts, and other types of civic leader-
ship (Post, 1993). Overall, the founder is the most locally embedded among the founding family members; as CEO, s/he plays
the most signiﬁcant role in corporate actions that favour the local community thus strengthening the existing ﬁrm-
community bond. Engaging in social initiatives is a way of securing endorsement by the press or the local government
and sustains the ﬁrm reputation, which is often associated with the family image (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore,
we postulate that the founder serving as CEO further increases the ﬁrm’s recognition within the hosting community and the
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preference for the stocks her/his ﬁrm issues. So, our last testable prediction becomes:
H3: founder-CEO founding family ﬁrms show higher LHB than other founding family ﬁrmsData collection and research methodology
Data
Firms issuing securities on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) over the period 1999e2011 represent the initial sample. The
observations i) on common stocks, ii) with ROEwithin plus andminus one range, and iii) headquartered in Italy are extracted.
Because valuation ratios for ﬁnancial ﬁrms are not comparable to valuation ratios for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, we excluded
ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC 6000e6999) throughout the analysis (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006). On the other hand, as both ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are possible in investors’ portfolio (e.g., Flavin, 2004), we kept ﬁnancial ﬁrms to compute variables on
the local supply of stocks (e.g., Baschieri et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2008). The ﬁnal sample includes 2,951 ﬁrm-year observations,
1,481 of which are family ﬁrms. Data at ﬁrm-level are from several sources: i) the databases provided by CONSOB (the Italian
regulator) to collect our initial sample and ownership data; ii) Osiris (Bureau Van Dijk database) and Company Annual Reports
to collect data on headquarters locations, then converted into latitude and longitude using Google Maps; iii) the electronic
archive of Il Sole 24Ore, which is themost prominent Italian ﬁnancial newspaper, to collect data on ﬁrm press coverage; iv) the
yearly investment guides Il Calepino dell’Azionista and Il Taccuino dell’Azionista, for ﬁrm age, information on the founders and
descendants and the composition of both the topmanagement team and the board of directors; v) the databases provided by
ISTAT, the Italian Institute of Statistics, for information on spatial and wealth distribution of Italian population; vi) Datastream
andWorldscope (Thompson Financial) for all other accounting and ﬁnancial information. In addition, NUTS Codes are used to
geographically split Italy (NUTS0) into three nested sub-areas, namely macro-areas (NUTS1), regions (NUTS2), and provinces
(NUTS3).Family ﬁrm measurement
Theory and research typically deﬁne family ﬁrms as ﬁrms where family members maintain ownership stakes and occupy
senior management positions (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Dyer andWhetten, 2006). Yet, there is lack of consensus on the
operational deﬁnition of family ﬁrms (e.g. Chua et al., 1999). For instance, Minichilli et al. (2010) deﬁne family ﬁrms as ﬁrms
where the same family ownsmore than 50% of the shares (the threshold is reduced to 30% for listed companies), and focus on
the effect of family management on the ﬁrm’s performance by classifying family ﬁrms using the ratio of the number of family
members in the top management team to the total number of top management team members. Anderson and Reeb (2003)
use the fractional equity ownership of the founding family and (or) the presence of family members on the Board of Directors.
Research clearly shows that control enhancing mechanisms, such as pyramid structures, multiple voting shares, and cross-
holdings, are deeply embedded in family businesses thus making direct ownership a potentially biased selector for family
ﬁrms. For instance, Villalonga and Amit (2009) show that in large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only block-
holders whose control rights, on average, exceed their cash-ﬂow rights. In order to overcome this issue and to categorize
family ﬁrms in light of their actual shareholder base, we identify the ‘ultimate owner’ of the ﬁrm through both direct and
indirect ownership. Therefore, we followed the trail backwards through the layers of ownership from each direct ownership
stake, and deﬁne a shareholder as ultimate owner if s/he controls e directly or through an investment vehicle e at least 10
percent of the ﬁrm (e.g., Faccio and Lang, 2002; Mengoli et al. 2009). This deﬁnition is consistent with international studies on
family ﬁrm ownership and ensures we only deﬁne family ﬁrms as those where themajority of votes are, directly or indirectly,
held by a family.
Instead of adopting a single deﬁnition, in line with Villalonga and Amit (2009) and Pazzaglia et al. (2013) we considered
multiple conditions and deﬁne family ﬁrms with dummy variables at three nested levels of ﬁrm family-ness using the ﬁrm
ownership, management, and control as criteria: (1) Family, a dummy variablewhich takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s ultimate
owner is a family; (2) Founding Family, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the subsample of Family where the
ultimate owner is the founding family and at least one of the founding family members sits on the Board of Directors; (3)
Founder CEO, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the subsample of Founding Family where the founder serves as
CEO.
The following examples should be useful in clarifying our family ﬁrm classiﬁcations. Consider the ﬁrm, Autogrill Spa,
founded in 1947 by the Pavesi family as a chain of roadside stands and restaurants. In 1977, facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
Autogrill Spa was bailed out by the government and merged with two other roadside restaurant operator chains. When
Autogrill Spa was privatized in 1995, the Benetton family acquired a controlling stake through the family ﬁnancial holding,
Edizione Srl. Autogrill Spawas listed on the Milan Stock Exchange in 1997, yet the Benetton family maintained a (greater than
10%) controlling stake of 50.1%, through the Edizione holding investment vehicle. Thus, we consider Autogrill Spa a family
ﬁrm, (indirectly) controlled by the Benetton family, which is the Autogrill Spa ultimate owner. Yet, Autogrill Spa is not
classiﬁed as a founding family ﬁrm as the Benetton family did not create or inherit the business (for a similar case see the
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Landi Renzo Spa, a world leader ﬁrm in eco-mobility. The company, founded in 1954 by the Landi family, went public in 2007.
Through Gireﬁn Spa and Gireimm Srl, two ﬁrms owned by the Landi family through the Trust Landi, a Jersey law trust whose
beneﬁciaries are the founder’s wife and son, the founding family (indirectly) controls the majority (i.e. 61.86%) of Landi Renzo
Spa. In addition Stefano Landi, a member of the second generation of the founding family, sits on the Board of Directors. As a
consequence, we classify Landi Renzo Spa as a founding family ﬁrm.
Family ﬁrms account for 50% (1,481 observations) of our sample: 36% (1,058 observations) are Founding Family, while 13%
(371 observations) are Founder CEO, which is consistent with prior studies showing the majority of Italian listed companies
are family ﬁrms (e.g., Barontini and Caprio, 2006), and supporting Italy as a quasi-experimental environment for in-
vestigations on family capitalism (Aganin and Volpin, 2005; Mengoli et al., 2009).
Other variables
We use the ﬁrm’s market-to-book value (MTBV) as dependent variable to measure corporate market value and, to account
for the strong positive skewness of the variable (MTBV skewness¼ 7.83), we take its logarithmic transformation (Log(MTBV))1
(e.g., Hong et al., 2008). As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis with MTBV and results remain unchanged (not
reported for brevity). As a proxy for the LHB, we consider the same variable adopted by Hong et al. (2008) who measure the
local equity-market conditions through the variable RATIO. RATIO is deﬁned for each ﬁrm as the ratio of the sum of the equity
book value of listed ﬁrms in the region (local supply of stocks) to the disposable income of households in the region (local
demand for stocks). Low values of RATIO reveal isolated ﬁrms or a low concentration of listed ﬁrms around the ﬁrm head-
quarters, and a high unsatisﬁed local potential demand for local stocks. On the other hand, a high value of RATIO deﬁnes
clustered ﬁrms and no (or little) unsatisﬁed local demand for stocks issued by nearby ﬁrms. Therefore, the LHB implies a
negative relation between RATIO and Log(MTBV), meaning that isolated ﬁrms trade at premium. Formally, considering the
geographic region j where i listed ﬁrms and k households are located at year t, we deﬁne RATIO as
RATIOj;t ¼
P
i Book Valuei;j;tP
k Disposable Incomek;j;t
(1)
2To identify the Italian regions we refer to NUTS2 subdivision. To exclude any artiﬁcial relationship between RATIO and
MTBV, in regression analysis, we calculate RATIO both excluding the Book Value of the corresponding ﬁrm from the numerator
and dropping ﬁnancial income from Disposable Income.
In the multivariate analysis, results are controlled through a rich set of control variables that can affect ﬁrm market
performance. We use: the ownership stake held by the owner (Own); equity proﬁtability (ROE); ﬁrm age (Log(Age)); ﬁrm size
(Log(Size)); ﬁrm press coverage (Log(1þPress Coverage)), based on the number of Il Sole 24Ore articles that mention the ﬁrm
name within the previous year; and the ﬁrm inclusion in the primary Italian equity market index (FTSE). Consistent with
previous ﬁndings (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009), Own, ROE, Press Coverage and FTSE are expected to be positively related to
Log(MTBV), while Age and Size are expected to have a negative effect. We also include year dummies to address temporal
trends and exchange segment listing dummies to account for market microstructure. Moreover, to deal with any time-series
and cross-sectional dependence that may characterize panel data sets, we run the analysis clustering standard errors at ﬁrm-
and year-level, as in Petersen (2009).
Regression approach
We investigate the effect of RATIO on Log(MTBV) in (1) Family, (2) Founding Family, and (3) Founder CEO. We expect a
negative relation between Log(MTBV) and RATIO, and according to testable hypotheses we expect the effect of RATIO on
Log(MTBV) is stronger shifting fromNon Family to Founder CEO. Operationally, as baseline, we ﬁrst estimate the effect of RATIO
on Log(MTBV). Then, we add the interaction term RATIO  Family to the model to assess the additive effect of RATIO on
Log(MTBV) due to the family ﬁrm status, as well as the stand-alone dummy Family as control. The coefﬁcient of the interaction
term represents the statistical test of the hypothesis H1. In the same vein, we further add the Founding Family dummy and the
interaction term RATIO Founding Family to test the hypothesis H2, and the Founder CEO dummywith RATIO Founder CEO to
test H3.1 The skewness of Log(MTBV) is equal to 0.19, that is decidedly closer to the target value of zero expected for a normal distribution compared to the 7.83
skewness measured for the MTBV variable.
2 There are three functional pieces of evidence supporting this choice. First of all, the average (median) surface area of each Italian region corresponds to
4.97% (5.79%) of Italy, which is approximately the same critical area (5.28% of the U.S. surface) that Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) ﬁnd effective in dis-
tinguishing local from non-local investors. Secondly, the regional sub-division most closely matches the Italian historical pre-uniﬁcation segmentation.
Therefore, the segmentation at region-level is more likely to catch the post-uniﬁcation persistent cultural segmentation thus emphasizing the behavioural
dynamics leading LHB (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Finally, referring to Italy, Guiso et al. (2004) show proof of the positive effects of regional ﬁnancial
development on the economic success of the same geographical area. Hence, the regional sub-division also allows us to control for local dynamics on the
ﬁnancial side.
Table 1
Founding family ﬁrm and type of local investors: the Landi Renzo Spa case-study. Panel A depicts the ownership structure of Landi Renzo Spa. Panel B i)
categorises the Italian shareholders of Landi Renzo Spa by location, as within (In-Province) and outside (Out-of-Province) the province of Landi Renzo Spa
headquarters; ii) reports the probability of holding at least one share of Landi Renzo Spa based on investor location, and iii) tests whether this probability is
higher for an In-Province investor than for an Out-of-Province investor. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A e Landi ownership structure as registered at July 31, 2009
Investor type Shareholder# Stake % Stake# (shares)
Family Landi Stefano CEO, Board VP & founder son 30.93% 33,247,565
Domenichini Giovanna Board Chairman & Founder Wife 30.93% 33,247,565
Retail Italian 7219 9.70% 10,422,387
Foreign 6 0.01% 7306
All 7225 9.71% 10,429,693
Institutional Italian 62 6.38% 6,853,955
Foreign 198 22.05% 23,703,363
All 260 28.43% 30,557,318
All 7487 100% 107,482,141
Panel B e Landi ownership structure & shareholders location
Shareholder# Potential investor# Prob (Landi investor) DProb (Landi investor)
Retail 7219 60,045,068 0.01% 0.17%*** (9.258)
In-Province 915 519,458 0.18%
Out-of-Province 6304 59,525,610 0.01%
Institutional 62 90,498 0.07% 0.48%*** (5.989)
In-Province 4 733 0.55%
Out-of-Province 58 89,765 0.06%
All 7281 60,137,235 0.01% 0.17%*** (8.374)
In-Province 919 520,191 0.18%
Out-of-Province 6362 59,617,044 0.01%
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LHB and type of local investors: a case-study
To gain deeper understanding of individual investor behaviour, we collected information on all the registered shareholders
(at July 31, 2009) of a typical Italian family ﬁrm, Landi Renzo Spa. For each of the 7,487 shareholders (representing the entire
ﬁrm shareholder base), we collected the following information: name, type of investor (i.e., family ﬁrmmember, institutional,
or retail), province of residence (ﬁrm headquarters for the institutional investors), and the number of shares and stake held.
These data provide a unique clinical insight into the characteristics of the actual investors holding shares in family ﬁrms and
are used to explore the LHB effect in a speciﬁc context.We beneﬁt from these data thanks to the extremely valuable support of
management at Landi Renzo Spa.
Table 1 provides a description of the 7,487 registered shareholders of Landi Renzo Spa, headquartered in the Reggio Emilia
province (North East Italy). Panel A depicts the Landi Renzo Spa ownership structure distinguishing the members of the
founding family (Family), from the retail and institutional investors (Retail vs. Institutional), located either in Italy or abroad
(Italian vs. Foreign). Panel B analyses the Italian shareholders located within and outside the Landi Renzo Spa province (In-
Province vs. Out-of-Province), and tests whether the probability of holding at least one share of Landi Renzo Spa is higher for
an investor In-Province than Out-of-Province (i.e., DProb(Landi Investor)>0). To the extent that the difference in the prob-
ability of being a Landi Renzo Spa shareholder In-Province and Out-of-Province is positive and statically signiﬁcant, evidence
of LHB is provided.
Panel A shows that ownership by the family ﬁrm founder’s wife (Giovanna Domenichini) and son (Stefano Landi) is over
50%, with an aggregate stake equal to 61.86% of ﬁrm equity3. The Italian retail investors account for 7,219 of the 7,485 (96.45%)
shareholders not in the family, with a total stake of 9.70%. Apart from the family members, the largest aggregate stake is held
in foreign institutional investors’ portfolios, with 198 investors owning 22.05% of the ﬁrm equity. Overall, 77.94% of the ﬁrm is
held in Italy.
Panel B shows that 915 of the 7,219 (12.68%) Italian retail shareholders of Landi Renzo Spa reside in the same province as
the ﬁrm, while the total number of individuals who reside in this province is 519,458, representing less than 1% (0.87%) of the
Italian population (60,045,068 individuals). The implication is that the probability that a retail investor will hold shares in
Landi Renzo Spa e computed as the ratio of the number of the actual retail shareholders (Shareholder #) to the resident
population (Potential Investor #) e is considerably higher In-Province, equalling 0.18%, than Out-of-Province, where it is only
0.01%. The difference in probabilities is equal to 0.17%, statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. In economic terms, these ﬁgures3 The family of the founder owns 61.86% of Landi Renzo Spa indirectly, via Gireﬁn Spa and Gireimm Srl; Gireﬁn Spa and Gireimm Srl are owned by the
Trust Landi, a Jersey law trust whose beneﬁciaries are Stefano Landi and Giovanna Domenichini: an equal indirect stake for each of the Landi family
members has been assumed.
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Figure 1. The geography of family ﬁrms and investors’ disposable income. The left-hand picture reports the yearly average value over the period 1999e2011 of
Disposable Income (in million euros) represented by the shading of the corresponding region (NUTS2). The right-hand picture reports the location of each ﬁrm’s
headquarters, distinguishing Non Family (orange-circular data-point), Family (brown-triangular data-point), Founding Family (blue-square data-point) and
Founder CEO (black-circular data-point).
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province, this tendency decreases to less than 1 person out of 1,000. Results do not signiﬁcantly differ when institutional
investors are considered. In fact 4 out of 62 (6.45%) institutional shareholders are headquartered in the same province as Landi
Renzo Spa, and the total number of Institutional In-Province shareholders is 733, or 0.81% of the 90,498 Italian institutional
investors. This means that an In-Province institutional investor has a probability of holding Landi Renzo Spa shares equal to
0.55%, with a difference that is 0.48% higher (and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level) than the probability associated with an
Out-of-Province institutional investor, equalling a mere 0.06%. This pattern is unchanged when the entire universe of
shareholders is considered: the signiﬁcantly higher probability of being a shareholder of Landi Renzo Spa for In-Province
investors provides conclusive evidence of the LHB in the Italian family ﬁrm setting, and supports an empirical investiga-
tion to test the effects of the phenomenon in this speciﬁc context. Finally, the fact that almost all (96.45%) the shareholders not
in the founding family are retail investors e of which 12.68% are In-Province e suggests the preference for local has a
behavioural root, as it mainly affects local retail investors. Ultimately, the small stake (only 6.38% of ﬁrm equity) held by Italian
institutional investors, and the fact that only 4 out of 62 is headquartered In-Province, suggests that the phenomenon is not
driven by large institutional investors, such as local banks or other intermediaries, in an attempt to exploit an information
advantage due to proximity4.Local market conditions and family ﬁrm characteristics
Figure 1 and Table 2 depict the ﬁrm sample and summary statistics. The left-side picture of Figure 1 shows the spatial
pattern of Italian investor Disposable Income, while the right-hand picture plots the headquarters of the sampled ﬁrms,
distinguishing Non Family, Family, Founding Family and Founder CEO ﬁrms. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the whole
sample (NUTS0), and the subsamples split by macro-areas (NUTS1) and regions (NUTS2).
Figure 1 points out that the Italian equity-market is characterized by a signiﬁcant spatial clustering of listed ﬁrms, together
with widespread investor wealth. Such a mismatch implies the presence of strong imbalances between the local demand and
the local supply for stocks. Table 2 provides a numerical quantiﬁcation of these ﬁgures. More than 75% (2,287 observations) of
Italian listed ﬁrms are located in the northern part of the country (56%, or 1,655 observations, of the ﬁrms are in the North-
West and 21%, or 632 observations, in the North-East). The Family representation is consistent in all macro-areas but the
South where Family is only about 28% (14 observations). For Founding Family and Founder CEO ﬁrms, we report similar
patterns. In line with previous ﬁndings, the northern areas of the country have higher than sample average values of RATIO,
while the southern areas and the Islands are lower than sample average.54 For robustness, we re-run the analyses taking the population with age equal or larger than 18 for Retail, and the number of all ﬁrms for Institutional. In
all cases, results (not reported) remain unchanged. In addition, in line with the regional perspective of the multivariate analysis, we re-run all the statistics
also considering In-Region and Out-of-Region investors. Results (not reported) are entirely unchanged.
5 Looking at the regional distribution, the highest values of RATIO are in Lazio (C), averaging 0.886 while Piedmont comes second with 0.693. This arises
because of the clustering of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) around the Italian capital, Rome (Lazio). Indeed, SOEs account for 5.5% (162 observations) of
our sample, of which an impressive 32.3% (52 observations) are in Rome. At the other end of the spectrum, not considering regions with no listed ﬁrms
where RATIO obviously equals zero, we ﬁnd Umbria (C), Abruzzo (S), Trentino Alto Adige (NE) and Sicily (I) averaging 0.001. The region of Apulia (S) follows
with 0.002.
Table 2
Family ﬁrms and the local supply and demand for stocks. Data are ranked upon RATIO. Book Value and Disposable Income are in million euros. Book Value,
Disposable Income, and RATIO are the average yearly values on 1999e2011.
Obs (%) Family (%) Founding (%) Founder CEO (%) Book value (%) Disposable income (%) RATIO
Italy (NUTS0) 2951 (100) 1481 (50) 1058 (36) 371 (13) 318,336 (100) 969,925 (100) 0.483
Macro-area (NUTS1)
Centre (C) 591 (20) 299 (51) 200 (34) 95 (16) 110,371 (35) 202,772 (21) 0.589
North-West (NW) 1655 (56) 792 (48) 544 (33) 137 (8) 171,700 (54) 303,102 (31) 0.582
North-East (NE) 632 (21) 360 (57) 288 (46) 131 (21) 34,690 (11) 211,223 (22) 0.163
Islands (I) 23 (1) 16 (70) 12 (52) 5 (22) 1069 (0) 81,602 (8) 0.007
South (S) 50 (2) 14 (28) 14 (28) 3 (6) 504 (0) 171,226 (18) 0.004
Region (NUTS2)
Lazio (C) 356 (12) 179 (50) 136 (38) 60 (17) 96,131 (30) 96,111 (10) 0.886
Piedmont (NW) 359 (12) 174 (48) 141 (39) 34 (9) 57,078 (18) 82,672 (9) 0.693
Lombardy (NW) 1225 (42) 600 (49) 393 (32) 103 (8) 99,357 (31) 187,672 (19) 0.554
Liguria (NW) 71 (2) 18 (25) 10 (14) 0 (0) 15,261 (5) 30,223 (3) 0.522
Friuli-VG (NE) 66 (2) 8 (12) 5 (8) 0 (0) 11,482 (4) 22,288 (2) 0.413
Tuscany (C) 170 (6) 81 (48) 25 (15) 11 (6) 12,954 (4) 66,284 (7) 0.170
Emilia-Romagna (NE) 359 (12) 225 (63) 187 (52) 94 (26) 12,410 (4) 85,105 (9) 0.146
Veneto (NE) 204 (7) 124 (61) 93 (46) 34 (17) 10,775 (3) 84,741 (9) 0.114
Marche (C) 52 (2) 38 (73) 38 (73) 23 (44) 1168 (0) 25,850 (3) 0.037
Sardinia (I) 14 (0) 12 (86) 12 (86) 5 (36) 986 (0) 22,116 (2) 0.012
Campania (S) 28 (1) 10 (36) 10 (36) 0 (0) 268 (0) 67,768 (7) 0.005
Molise (S) 11 (0) 1 (9) 1 (9) 0 (0) 155 (0) 4285 (0) 0.004
Apulia (S) 9 (0) 3 (33) 3 (33) 3 (33) 232 (0) 49,242 (5) 0.002
Sicily (I) 9 (0) 4 (44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 152 (0) 59,486 (6) 0.001
Trentino AA (NE) 3 (0) 3 (100) 3 (100) 3 (100) 88 (0) 19,089 (2) 0.001
Abruzzo (S) 2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 25 (0) 18,539 (2) 0.001
Umbria (C) 13 (0) 1 (8) 1 (8) 1 (8) 119 (0) 14,527 (1) 0.001
Calabria (S) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 23,979 (2) 0.000
Basilicata (S) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7413 (1) 0.000
Aosta Valley (NW) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2535 (0) 0.000
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(Panel A), Founding Family vs. Non Founding Family (Panel B), and Founder CEO vs. Non Founder CEO (Panel C).
As far as the dependent variable (MTBV) is concerned, the investigated subsamples are not signiﬁcantly different among
each other, at least using a parametric t-test6. A similar behaviour is detected for the main endogenous variable RATIO,
suggesting the geographical distribution of the investigated sample is not affected by ﬁrm ownership, management and
control. Otherwise, Own, Age, Size, Press Coverage, and FTSE signiﬁcantly differ among the subsamples. For instance, the higher
the family involvement in the ﬁrm, the higher the average ownership stake held by the family, equalling 47% for Family, 50%
for Founding Family, and 53% for Founder CEO ﬁrms. Similar patterns can also be detected for the remaining variables. In
conclusion, the family ﬁrm status discriminates companies when most of the main ﬁrm characteristics are considered; yet, it
does not imply a difference related to the geographic, environmental conditions. In other words, non-family and the different
types of family ﬁrms, on average, are not signiﬁcantly different from each other at least as far their geographic distribution is
concerned: for instance, family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms are not clustered in distinct areas of the country, where
environmental-speciﬁc features (e.g. the economic development of the area) can discordantly affect their performance. Yet,
the evidence that most of the considered variables diverge among the subsamples implies that we cannot limit the empirical
testing to the univariate analysis, and that we need to control for their effect on MTBV with a multivariate approach.
Family ﬁrm value within regionally segmented market
Table 4 reports the results of the effect of RATIO on Log(MTBV) based on family ﬁrm status. Model (1) is our baseline
speciﬁcation while Models (2), (3), and (4) test whether the LHB increases in Family, Founding Family, and Founder CEO ﬁrms
respectively.
Model (1) shows that in our sample the LHB is in place, consistent with ﬁndings by Hong et al. (2008) for the US market.
In fact, the effect of RATIO on MTBV is negative and statistically signiﬁcant as expected (b¼0.113, p<0.01), meaning that
more isolated listed ﬁrms trade at a premium thanks to the local investors dedicated clientele. Yet, Model (2) highlights that
the LHB does not indiscriminately exist in all ﬁrms and is only found in family ﬁrms. In fact, once Family ﬁrms are analysed,
the RATIO parameter loses its statistical power (b¼0.011, p>0.10), which shifts into the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of
RATIO Family, negative and signiﬁcant as expected (b¼0.178, p<0.05). H1 is, therefore, supported. When we consider6 For all the investigated samples, MTBV mean values are higher than median values. Consistent with the statistic reported in Section 3.3, this evidence
further proves MTBV skewness and supports the use of the logarithmic version of the variable in the multivariate analysis.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis by family ﬁrm. The mean and median univariate comparisons of the main variables involved in the multivariate
analysis are reported for the subsamples of Family and Non Family (Panel A), Founding Family and Non Founding Family (Panel B), and Founder CEO and Non
Founder CEO (Panel C). ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
m Median m Median jtj jc2j
Panel A Family (N¼ 1481) Non family (N¼ 1470)
MTBV 2.37 1.73 2.33 1.73 0.64 1.57
RATIO 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.08
Own 0.47 0.52 0.44 0.50 10.42*** 104.21***
ROE 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.41 1.86
Age 23 24 26 32 6.14*** 54.62***
Size 2,211,313 322,173 4,505,380 453,374 9.77*** 272.75***
Press Coverage 12.55 11.94 16.78 15.03 10.32*** 88.57***
FTSE 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.00 11.07*** 39.66***
Panel B Founding Family (N¼ 1058) Non Founding Family (N¼ 423)
MTBV 2.30 1.73 2.60 1.71 0.53 0.09
RATIO 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 1.78* 2.35
Own 0.50 0.54 0.39 0.43 12.56*** 148.48***
ROE 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 1.34 0.80
Age 24 24 21 22 5.83*** 47.92***
Size 1,882,669 328,945 3,246,217 287,610 7.40*** 161.09***
Press Coverage 12.81 11.94 11.82 11.02 7.00*** 36.29***
FTSE 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.00 9.04*** 26.94***
Panel C Founder CEO (N¼ 371) Non Founder CEO (N¼ 687)
MTBV 2.55 1.89 2.16 1.65 1.30 4.95**
RATIO 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.79 0.32
Own 0.53 0.57 0.49 0.53 9.04*** 81.61***
ROE 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 3.15*** 18.47***
Age 15 18 31 33 9.61*** 107.45***
Size 495,052 200,215 2,692,797 400,606 4.36*** 174.47***
Press Coverage 11.02 11.02 14.01 14.01 6.41*** 44.8***
FTSE 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.58*** 19.14***
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RATIO Founding Family, is negative and highly signiﬁcant (b¼0.378, p<0.05), while the coefﬁcients of RATIO and
RATIO Family are no longer signiﬁcant (RATIO: b¼0.007, p>0.10; RATIO Family: b¼0.107, p>0.10). To sum up, while
Founding Family ﬁrms are affected by local equity-market conditions, acquired family ﬁrms are not, suggesting that the LHB
previously reported for Family is only attributable to the subsample of Founding Family ﬁrms. H2 is, therefore, supported. In
Model (4) the effect of RATIO is further split to distinguish Founder CEO ﬁrms. The coefﬁcient of RATIO Founder CEO is
negative and highly signiﬁcant (RATIO Founder CEO: b¼0.379, p<0.05), supporting H3. On the other hand,
RATIO Founding Family loses its power (RATIO Founding Family: b¼0.224, p>0.10). In all models, relations with the
control variables have the expected signs and are all statistically signiﬁcant (e.g., Model 4, Press Coverage: b¼0.137, p<0.01).
Overall, after controlling for the variables the literature recognizes as able to affect ﬁrm market performance, the multi-
variate analysis highlights statistically signiﬁcant effects between RATIO and MTBV, and entirely supports our hypotheses.
In particular, the investor preference for local equity is entirely driven by founding family ﬁrms where the founder serves as
CEO: the non orthogonal, nested, deﬁnition we use to classify the different types of family ﬁrms ﬁts with the aim of our
analysis and helps explain why the more nested groups of family ﬁrms, with progressively stronger ties to the local
community, are able to capture most of the effect we highlight.
The intuition on the economic impact of our ﬁndings is presented in Figure 2, which depicts the relation between the local
equity-market conditions measured through the variable RATIO (x-axis) and the ﬁrm market-to-book value (y-axis) for
different types of family ﬁrms.
The magnitude of the LHB, measured by the slope of the function that links RATIO andMTBV, increases with each level of
ﬁrm family-ness, reaching its highest point with Founder CEO ﬁrms. Indeed, using the estimates of Model (4) of Table 4, a
Founder CEO family ﬁrm headquartered in the highest RATIO region (Lazio, RATIO¼0.886) would have an estimated market-
to-book of about 1.27 (exp(0.379  0.886 þ 0.58)¼1.27)7, while the same ﬁrm located for instance Emilia-Romagna
(RATIO¼0.146) has an estimated market-to-book on average the 33 percent higher, and equal to 1.69
(exp(0.379 0.146þ 0.58)¼1.69). According to our results, this difference in value (1.691.27¼0.42) is due to the LHB for a
Founder CEO ﬁrm. On the other hand, considering the baseline model (Model (1) of Table 3) and irrespective of the family
ﬁrm type, which is found to signiﬁcantly drive the results, the market-to-book is about 1.11 for a ﬁrm headquartered in Lazio7 Estimates are obtained as the product of the coefﬁcient of RATIO times the level of RATIO in the considered region plus a constant given by the sum of
the products of the statistically signiﬁcant estimated parameters and the values of the variables for the average ﬁrm. The value of the variables is
approximated by the variable average value.
Table 4
The effect of RATIO on value in family ﬁrms. t-test on clustered standard errors at year and ﬁrm level are reported. Model 5 reports Bootstrap with 1000
replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Log(MTBV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RATIO 0.113*** (3.89) 0.011 (0.19) 0.007 (0.12) 0.010 (0.19) 0.010 (0.12)
RATIO  family 0.178** (2.59) 0.107 (0.80) 0.105 (0.78) 0.105 (0.61)
RATIO  founding family 0.378** (2.53) 0.224 (1.22) 0.224 (1.57)
RATIO  founder CEO 0.379** (2.62) 0.377*** (2.67)
Family 0.052 (1.46) 0.107 (1.82) 0.108 (1.82) 0.108 (1.41)
Founding family 0.215** (3.13) 0.157* (2.00) 0.157** (2.05)
Founder CEO 0.111* (1.90) 0.111 (1.43)
Own 0.085* (2.29) 0.086** (2.36) 0.079* (2.16) 0.098** (2.67) 0.098 (1.44)
ROE 0.255 (1.30) 0.262 (1.34) 0.253 (1.28) 0.249 (1.27) 0.249 (1.12)
Log(Age) 0.081*** (6.81) 0.084*** (6.79) 0.085*** (6.89) 0.085*** (6.72) 0.085*** (5.67)
Log(Size) 0.083*** (6.45) 0.084*** (6.28) 0.086*** (6.46) 0.084*** (6.22) 0.084*** (7.45)
Log(1 þ Press Coverage) 0.142*** (5.67) 0.141*** (5.56) 0.138*** (5.43) 0.137*** (5.29) 0.137*** (6.98)
FTSE 0.431*** (8.39) 0.426*** (8.35) 0.435*** (8.47) 0.425*** (8.19) 0.425*** (8.64)
Constant 1.110*** (6.22) 1.098*** (5.72) 1.272*** (6.22) 1.252*** (6.05) 1.252*** (8.04)
Dummy market YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy year YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2951 2951 2951 2951 2951
R2-adj 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23
Figure 2. The Local Home Bias asset pricing implications in family ﬁrms. Parameters to draw single functions are from Table 4 (in brackets the model employed).
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ascribed to the LHB is only 0.1 (1.21e1.11¼0.1).Validity issues
To test the structural validity of our models, we run additional robustness checks. In particular, in Model (5) of Table 3 we
re-run Model (4) of Table 3 via boostrapping, using 1,000 replications (with replacement) of sub-samples of 1,000 obser-
vations each. The main ﬁndings are unchanged. For example, the coefﬁcient of RATIO  Founder CEO is negative and highly
signiﬁcant as previously reported (b¼0.377, p<0.01).
Then, we consider that one of the main changes in the Italian corporate governance legal framework occurred in 2004,
resulting in an increased degree of autonomy and ﬂexibility achievable through the company by-laws (i.e. ‘Vietti’s law’). To
control for regulatory changes we split our sample in two subsamples of observations before and after 2004, and replicate the
analysis of Model (4) in Table 3. Once again, ﬁndings (not reported) are unchanged with respect to previous results.
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Key ﬁndings
Understanding the roots of investors’ tendency to overinvest in nearby listed (family) ﬁrms has received scant attention
within the literature. Yet, the implications of the so-called LHB are highly relevant for both ﬁrm management and entre-
preneurial activity as the LHB affects the corporatemarket values and the ﬁrm’s cost of capital (e.g., Hong et al. 2008; Korniotis
and Kumar, 2013). In light of the importance of family-controlled ﬁrms in the corporate landscape around the world (e.g.,
Faccio and Lang, 2002), this paper ﬁlls this gap by addressing the link between the locally embedded nature of family ﬁrms
and the LHB.
We ﬁnd that the particular link a family ﬁrm establishes with its hosting community boosts the investor’s preference for
local stocks. The LHB does not indiscriminately exist in all family ﬁrms, but is particularly relevant in founding family ﬁrms
where the founder serves as CEO. In fact, creating a business instils in the founder a greater identiﬁcationwith the community
(e.g., Hollander and Elman, 1988), which, in turn, translates into a greater local involvement both at corporate- and family-
level. Ultimately, the founder enhances corporate actions that maximize familiarity with the founding family ﬁrm by local
investors, thus favourably shaping their trading pattern. All other things being equal, isolated and locally committed family
ﬁrms are able to boost feelings of familiarity and capture the local unsatisﬁed demand for stocks that pushes the ﬁrm’s stock
price up: the isolated founder-managed family ﬁrm headquartered in regionswith a short supply of local stocks has a value on
average about 33 percent higher than the clustered founder-managed family ﬁrm located in regions with the presence of
several listed ﬁrms. Overall, founder-CEO founding family ﬁrms exploit the local dedicated clientele and shrink their cost of
funding.Implications for researchers
Our contribution to the literature takes on several different dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
show detailed data on the Register of Shareholders from a family ﬁrm. We believe our case-study, with the analysis of a
founding family ﬁrm ownership structure and shareholder location, provides new and conclusive evidence on the existence
of LHB within the Italian family ﬁrm setting. In addition, the distinction between local retail and institutional investors sheds
light on the underlying mechanism driving the LHB and related effects.
The literature indicates that family ﬁrm characteristics are peculiar, compared to other types of businesses, and can be best
examined with dedicated studies (e.g., Salvato and Aldrich, 2012). Our results add evidence to these factors, showing the
greater ability of family ﬁrms to trigger the LHB which in turn affects corporate aspects such as payout policy (e.g., Becker
et al., 2011), corporate market value or the ﬁrm cost of capital (e.g., Hong et al., 2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013). Ulti-
mately, we add to the existing literature by showing a (local) perspective that sheds new light on the prior ﬁndings and
expands the current understanding of the issue. As an example, Naldi et al. (2013) show family ﬁrms with a family CEO
perform differently based on their business context. These ﬁrms over-perform compared to other family ﬁrms in industrial
districts where social norms and the informal component of the institutional environment is particularly important; yet, they
underperform in stock exchange markets due to higher governance burden or managerial opportunistic behaviors. While our
results showing the superior performance of the listed founder-managed family ﬁrms may appear to conﬂict with Naldi et al.
(2013), we consider a novel (local) perspective, thus supporting their evidence and highlighting a connection between their
diverse results. In fact, we ﬁnd the listed founder-managed family ﬁrms trade at a premium due to a local investor preference
generated by the relationships the founder CEO builds through interdependent linkages between the ﬁrm and the local
stakeholders such as local suppliers and ﬁnancial institutions. Consistent with Naldi et al. (2013), we expect local bonds to be
much stronger in industrial districts even for listed founder-managed family ﬁrms. Similarly, the sizable but mixed evidence
supporting family ﬁrms as best performers (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), could be reinterpreted
by considering a local perspective. A large part of the literature highlights that family ﬁrms bear a discount factor in their
evaluation (among the ﬁrst, Holderness and Sheenan,1988), yet our ﬁndings show opposite results where family ﬁrms, with a
founder CEO embedded in the local community, trade at a premium compared to other family and non-family ﬁrms. Our
results are in linewith Villalonga and Amit (2006) showing that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves
as the CEO in the family ﬁrm or as the Chairman in ﬁrms with a hired CEO. In addition, we add a novel perspective of analysis
to the prior literature and suggest that only the isolated and locally committed family ﬁrms ultimately trade at a premium.
The clustered family ﬁrms are in fact unable to exploit the dedicated local clientele pushing stock prices up, thus explaining
the evidence of negative performance in the literature on family ﬁrms.
The lack of results we ﬁnd for the isolated vs. clustered non-family ﬁrms also represents new evidence to the literature
that, so far, has not considered the peculiar dynamics of family ﬁrms (e.g., Hong et al., 2008). We suggest the lack of results on
the local non-family ﬁrms is related to a lower commitment that non-family ﬁrms have in forming bonds with their local
community. This behaviour might be explained by several factors, such as non-family ﬁrms placing greater emphasis on
business internationalization policies (e.g., Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) or their lower commitment
in responding to local institutional pressures (Berrone et al., 2010). We believe the local behaviour of non-family ﬁrms is
worth investigating and represents a call for future research.
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treated as a multidimensional topic from both a methodological and a theoretical standpoint. Despite a growing number of
studies on the effect of ﬁrm location on multiple aspects of corporate ﬁnance and entrepreneurship (e.g., Carosi, 2016; Chen
et al., 2014), no investigation has been published with speciﬁc reference to family ﬁrms.We ﬁll a gap in the ﬁnancial literature
and highlight that the spatial dimension is even more critical for family owned businesses because of increased local
involvement. Yet, we highlight that family ﬁrms are not a homogeneous group even in their ability to build ties with the local
community or their focus on social, rather than economic, goals. Recent research shows ﬁrms with high local ownership have
better internal governance (Chhaochharia et al. 2012) and geographically proximate ﬁrms have similar ﬁnancing policies (Gao
et al. 2011). Meanwhile, founding family ﬁrms epitomize local ownership (Chrisman et al. 1998) and debt-aversion (Gonzalez
et al., 2013). So, the spatial dimension explains corporate governance, leverage, and related performance implications across
different types of family ﬁrms. In light of multiple aspects of corporate geography, we believe there are several directions for
future research.
Finally, recent literature documents that media affects returns (Fang and Peress, 2009) and local media affects local trading
(Engelberg and Parsons, 2011). As a ﬁrm’s current owner can inﬂuence local investors especially where there is a stronger link
with the territory, the interdependent relationship between family ﬁrms and local media e for instance looking at how local
media represent local family ﬁrms e is a promising ﬁeld of research. Moving forward, a less stereotyped approach is needed.
Using a dynamic framework, the aim should be to investigate the potential of family businesses in affecting the social
environment and, in doing so, their practice and performance. To date, it is still unclear whether shrinking the cost of funding
is an intended result family ﬁrms explicitly seek when engaging with the local community or if it is an accidental, yet
welcome, consequence of a behaviour aimed at, for example, enhancing the family’s socio-emotional wealth. Understanding
the prevalence of economic or non-economic drivers behind family ﬁrm actions is not speciﬁcally tackled in this study and
deﬁnitely represents a call for future research.
Implications for policy-makers and practitioners
Policy increasingly encourages the development and creation of new ventures, especially in the more economically
depressed areas of the country, where problems of regional and social inequality are highest. Yet, particularly after the global
ﬁnancial crisis, it is increasingly difﬁcult and expensive to access to new capital in order to expand or establish new business
activities (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). In this context, the literature shows that in deprived communities, family ﬁrms focus on
both economic and social goals more than other types of businesses (Birley et al. 1999). In contrast with conventional ap-
proaches, our results suggest the representation of family ﬁrms is more intricate than the “local fairy godmother”, as
corporate and family member actions within the local community attract local investor funding which ultimately shrinks the
ﬁrm’s cost of capital. Within this framework, the family’s local involvement could have opportunistic traits and the founder
management appears to be thewatershed. In someways, the apparently clear distinction between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
factors in family ﬁrm’s owner utility functions is indeed ambiguous. In fact, the ﬁrm’s contributions to the local community or
even its philanthropy translate into a pecuniary beneﬁt due to the decrease in the cost of funding because of the local
dedicated clientele exploitation. For example, the recent acquisition by Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway of the Omaha World-
Herald Co., Warren Buffet’s hometown newspaper, could be driven by economic reasons rather than by an attempt to sup-
port Buffet’s local community. In other words, philanthropy may have more than merely social effects, as it creates value for
the ﬁrm through an improvement of the business perception. Thus, when deﬁning local development strategies or policies
supporting philanthropy activities, policymakers need to consider the non-trivial implications of investor preference for local
family ﬁrms stocks. A similar conclusion holds for family ﬁrms activating a corporate social responsibility policy.
Finally, in light of these ﬁndings, as local shareholders can have a signalling effect for non-local shareholders and local
shareholders tend to be attracted by founder-managed founding family ﬁrms, the latter could eventually be considered a
preferable vehicle for pushing the economic development of the more depressed areas in a country.Acknowledgements
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